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Capital Market Liberalization 
and Exchange Rate Regimes: 
Risk without Reward 
By JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ 
ABSTRACT: his paper examines the consequences of capital mar- 
ket liberalization, with special reference to its effects under different 
exchange rate regimes. Capital market liberalization has not lead to 
faster growth in developing countries, but has led to greater risks. It 
describes how International Monetary Fund policies have exacer- 
bated the risks, as a result of the macro-economic response to crises, 
with bail-out packages that have intensified moral hazard problems. 
The paper provides a critique of the arguments for capital market lib- 
eralization. It argues that capital flows give rise to large externali- 
ties, which affect others than the borrower and lender, and whenever 
there are large externalities, there is potential scope for government 
interventions, some of which are welfare increasing. 
Joseph E. Stiglitz holds joint professorships at Columbia University's Economics 
Department, School of International and Public Affairs, and Business School. From 
1997 to 2000 he was the World Bank's Senior Vice President for Development 
Economics and Chief Economist. From 1995 to 1997, he served as Chairman of the US. 
Council of Economic Advisers and a member ofPresident Bill Clinton's cabinet. He was 
previously a professor of economics at Stanford, Princeton, Yale, and All Souls College, 
Oxford. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2001 for his analysis of 
markets with asymmetric information. 
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OR almost half a decade, capital 
market liberalization raged as 
the prime battleground between 
those who were pushing for and 
against globalization, and for good 
reason: By the mid-1990s, the notion 
that free trade or at least freer trade 
brought benefits both to the devel- 
oped and the less developed coun- 
tries seemed well accepted. Presi- 
dent Clinton could claim passage of 
NAFTA and the Uruguay Round, 
with the establishment of the World 
Trade Organization, among the ma- 
jor achievements of his first four 
years. APEC and the Americas had 
both committed themselves to creat- 
ing a free-trade area. Not only had 
the intellectual battle been won- 
only special interests resisted trade 
liberalization-but so seemingly had 
the political battle. On other fronts, 
the broader liberalization/free- 
market agenda was winning victory 
after victory: the Uruguay round had 
extended the scope of traditional 
trade liberalization to include liber- 
alization in financial services, the 
protection of intellectual property 
rights, and even investment. Al- 
though the Multilateral Investment 
Agreement was having trouble, in- 
vestment protections in NAFTA 
were cited as a basis on which further 
agreements could be reached. Even 
"liberal" governments-the demo- 
cratic administration in the United 
States, the labor government in Brit- 
ain-embraced privatization and de- 
regulation, with the United States 
going so far as to push through the 
privatization of the corporation mak- 
ing enriched uranium, the core ingre- 
dient in making nuclear weapons (as 
well as fuel for nuclear reactors). 
Only capital market liberalization- 
eliminating the restrictions on the 
free flow of short-term capital-re- 
mained as a point of contention. At 
its annual meetings in Hong Kong, 
the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) sought to settle this issue too: 
it asked for a change in its charter, to 
give it a mandate to push for capital 
market liberalization, just as it had a 
mandate, in its founding, for the 
elimination of capital controls that 
interfered with trade. 
The timing could not have been 
worse: the East Asia crisis was brew- 
ing. Thailand had already suc- 
cumbed, with a crisis that began on 
2 July. The delegates to the Hong 
Kong meeting had hardly unpacked 
their bags on returning home when 
the crisis struck in Indonesia. Within 
a little more than a year, it had 
become a global economic crisis, 
touching virtually every corner of the 
globe, with bailouts billed at more 
than 150 billion dollars occurring not 
only in Thailand and Indonesia, but 
Korea, Brazil, and Russia. And it was 
clear that hot, speculative money- 
short-term capital flows-was at the 
heart of the crisis: if they had not 
caused it, they at least played a cen- 
tral role in its propagation. The only 
two large emerging markets to be 
spared the ravages of the global 
financial crisis were India and 
China, both of which had imposed 
capital controls. (Even as the global 
economy faced a major slowdown, 
China managed to grow by more 
than 7 percent, India by more than 5 
percent). Malaysia had imposed capi- 
tal controls to help it manage its way 
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through the crisis, and as a result, its 
downturn was shorter, and as it 
recovered, it was left with less of a 
legacy of debt than the other coun- 
tries because it had imposed capital 
controls. By the time matters settled 
down, the IMF had markedly 
changed its tune: its chief economist 
(Mussa 2000) admitted that finan- 
cial market liberalization could have 
markedly adverse effects on less 
developed countries that were not 
adequately prepared for it (in the 
view of many economists in the 
developing world, this meant virtu- 
ally all developing countries).' It 
admitted that its predictions (and 
those of the U.S. Treasury) that 
Malaysia's imposition of controls 
would prove to be a disaster had been 
wrong-they had succeeded in spite 
of what might have seemed as efforts 
to undermine the country through 
public criticism of an almost unprec- 
edented nature.2 
But while the intellectual battle 
was thus seemingly over, the political 
battle continued: the managing 
director of the IMF, Michel Cam- 
dessus, continued pushing for capital 
market liberalization in his annual 
speeches until his departure from the 
IMF. And countries that propose 
going back on capital market liberal- 
ization are strongly advised against 
it-to the point of implicit or explicit 
threats of having programs cut off.3 
But these political battles are, for 
the most part, going on behind the 
scenes. The more visible political 
debate has moved back to issues 
thought at one time settled-for 
instance, to trade and intellectual 
property rights. Still, revisiting that 
earlier debate has much to teach us, 
both about economics and politics. It 
is precisely because the disjunction 
between the positions that the IMF 
took and the theory and evidence 
concerning capital market liberaliza- 
tion, between their mandate to pro- 
mote global stability, and the policy 
which seem so patently to lead to 
global instability was so great that 
the debate on capital market liberal- 
ization throws into such stark relief 
broader aspects of the globalization 
controversy. (In other arenas, such as 
trade liberalization, theory and evi- 
dence are more ambiguous, and 
while the IMF may have pushed poli- 
cies that could not be defended as 
fulfilling its mandate, neither could 
they, by and large, be criticized 
for actually going against their 
mandate.) 
The consequences of capital mar- 
ket liberalization depend, of course, 
in part, but only in part, on the 
exchange rate regime, which is the 
focus of many of the articles in this 
issue. But before turning to that 
issue, it is important to understand 
the more general case against and for 
capital market liberalization. Ac- 
cordingly, in this article, I propose 
first to explain the strength of the 
opposition to capital market liberal- 
ization: it increases the risks facing a 
country while it does not promote 
economic growth. Given the over- 
whelming theory and evidence 
against capital market liberaliza- 
tion, one wonders: how could the 
major international organization 
responsible for promoting growth 
and stability have promoted a policy 
that seemed so contrary to its objec- 
tives? I first review the arguments 
that were put forward for capital 
221 
This content downloaded from 128.59.160.233 on Wed, 3 Apr 2013 15:18:16 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 
market liberalization. I then turn to 
the deeper political economy ques- 
tions, exploring the role of ideology 
and interests. I conclude by arguing 
that at the root of the problem is gov- 
ernance: the governance structure of 
the IMF led it to push for policies that 
were contradictory to its mandate for 
promoting global stability and that 
reflected the interests and ideology of 
those to whom it was directly 
accountable. There is, in this, an 
important lesson for the evolving 
globalization debate, to which I turn 
briefly in the concluding section. 
THE ECONOMIC CASE 
AGAINST CAPITAL 
MARKET LIBERALIZAITON 
The evidence is that capital mar- 
ket liberalization is not associated 
with faster economic growth or 
higher levels of investment but is 
associated with higher levels of eco- 
nomic volatility and risk. And, in 
general, the poor bear the brunt of 
much of this risk, especially in devel- 
oping countries, where safety nets 
(like unemployment insurance sys- 
tems) are nonexistent or inadequate. 
Growth 
Ascertaining whether trade liber- 
alization, or capital market liberal- 
ization, leads to faster economic 
growth is not an easy matter. A stan- 
dard, though widely discredited, 
methodology entails looking at the 
growth rates of different countries, 
attempting to ascertain whether 
those who have liberalized more or 
faster have grown faster, controlling 
for other factors that might have 
affected growth. The problematic 
nature of such studies is highlighted 
by the contradictory results that 
have been obtained in the trade liber- 
alization literature, with scholars 
like Sachs and Warner (1995) argu- 
ing that trade liberalization is sys- 
tematically associated with growth, 
and others, like Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (1999), questioning the 
results. The results are highly sensi- 
tive to issues like how to weight the 
experience of different countries and 
how to separate causal factors with 
mere association. For instance, 
China with its more than 1 billion 
people has been the fastest growing 
developing country in the world; 
growth in China accounts for a sub- 
stantial fraction (by some accounts, 
two-thirds or more) of total growth 
among the low-income countries. But 
should China-which did not liberal- 
ize-be given the same weight in the 
analysis as some small country in 
Africa with a couple million people? 
If some of these small countries grew 
slightly faster, some grew slightly 
slower, and on average, those who lib- 
eralized grew slightly faster, are we 
to infer that liberalization is an 
important ingredient in growth- 
when the world's major success story, 
with growth a multiple of that of any 
of the African countries, did not liber- 
alize? The matter can be put another 
way: if one treated the separate prov- 
inces of China as separate data 
points-and they are each large, 
many times the size of the average 
African states, and each followed 
slightly different policies-then the 
twenty fastest growers in the past 
two decades are all in China. A study 
that treated these provinces as units 
of analysis might conclude strongly 
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that liberalization was not good for 
growth, while a study that treated 
China as a single data point might 
conclude that it was. 
There are other statistical prob- 
lems. Assume it were the case that 
countries that did not liberalize, on 
average, were more authoritarian 
and that authoritarianism is bad for 
growth; but in the statistical analysis 
of growth, no measure of authoritari- 
anism was included, or a measure 
that did not capture the relevant 
dimensions of a multidimensional 
political construct. Then, the statisti- 
cal analysis might conclude that lib- 
eralization was good for growth, 
when the correct conclusion is that 
nonauthoritarian political struc- 
tures, appropriately defined, are 
good for growth. 
What was most remarkable about 
the drive for capital market liberal- 
ization from the IMF was that at the 
time they pushed for this change in 
the global economic architecture, 
there was no study even of the cross- 
country statistical kind that sup- 
ported trade liberalization, as dis- 
credited as those studies might be, 
which provided empirical evidence in 
support of capital market liberaliza- 
tion. The one widely cited study by 
Rodrik (1998)-using the IMF's own 
measures of liberalization-showed 
that it did not lead to faster economic 
growth. One might have thought that 
the IMF would have made a major 
effort to refute Rodrik's study and to 
present countervailing studies show- 
ing the contrary. That they did not, 
and that they seemingly did not feel 
the need to refute the even more com- 
pelling evidence showing that capital 
market liberalization led to greater 
risks, may say a great deal about the 
nature of the organization, a point to 
which we return later. 
But there is, perhaps, a simpler 
reason: Rodrik's (1998) study merely 
corroborated what was obvious, both 
empirically and theoretically. It was 
not only China that had grown rap- 
idly without capital market liberal- 
ization; India, too, had experienced 
rapid growth over the 1990s, and it 
too had not liberalized. Russia had 
liberalized, and the liberalization 
had led not to a flow of capital into 
the country but to massive capital 
flight, and the country's GDP had, 
partly as a result, plummeted by 
more than 40 percent, a decline that 
was reflected in socioeconomic statis- 
tics, such as marked shortening of 
life spans, and in data, collected 
through household surveys, showing 
an increase in poverty from around 
2 percent to between 25 percent and 
40 percent, depending on the mea- 
sure used. 
But these results should not have 
come as a surprise. Growth is related 
to investment, to new enterprises 
and old enterprises expanding. Such 
investments cannot be based on spec- 
ulative money that can come into and 
out of a country on a moment's notice. 
On the contrary, the high volatility 
associated with such flows de- 
stabilizes the economy, as we shall 
see in the next section, and the 
higher economic volatility makes 
investment less attractive. 
There is another channel through 
which capital market liberalization 
hurts growth. The flow of funds into 
the country leads, under flexible ex- 
change rates, into a higher exchange 
rate, making it more difficult for a 
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country to export or compete against 
imports (a version of the so-called 
Dutch disease problem). In some 
cases, such as Thailand, the funds 
helped feed a speculative real estate 
boom, which distorted the economy. 
To prevent inflation, to sterilize the 
inflow of funds, which might other- 
wise have led to an excess demand for 
goods, the monetary authorities had 
to raise interest rates, which stifled 
investment in other sectors.4 The dis- 
tinction between foreign direct 
investment and these short-term 
flows could not be clearer. The foreign 
direct investment leads directly to an 
increase in GDP and in employment; 
it brings with it new technology, 
access to markets, and training- 
none of which accompany specula- 
tive portfolio flows. 
There is another way of seeing the 
adverse effects on growth: today, 
countries are told to keep reserves 
equal to their foreign denominated 
short-term liabilities. Consider the 
consequence of a company within a 
poor small country borrowing money 
from an American bank $100 million 
in dollars short term, paying say 
18 percent or 20 percent interest. The 
country then is forced to put a corre- 
sponding amount in reserves- 
money that could have gone toward 
high-return investments in schools, 
health clinics, roads, or factories. The 
reserves are held in the form of U.S. 
treasury bills, yielding 4 percent. 
In effect, the country is lending 
$100 million to the United States at 4 
percent and borrowing it back again 
at 20 percent-at a net cost of $16 
million a year to the country, a trans- 
action that clearly might be good for 
growth in the United States but is 
unlikely to have a substantial posi- 
tive effect on the growth of the 
developing country.5 
Risk 
The rapid movement of funds into 
and out of a country is clearly 
destabilizing, a point brought home 
forcefully by the East Asian crisis, 
where the capital outflows exceeded 
in some cases 10 percent of GDP. 
Flows of that magnitude (equivalent 
to close to $1 trillion for the United 
States) would be highly disruptive, 
even in a country with strong finan- 
cial markets. The effects on develop- 
ing countries have been devastating. 
Empirical studies have shown 
that there is a systematic relation- 
ship between capital market liberal- 
ization and instability (see Demirgiiq- 
Kunt and Detragiache 1997, 1999). 
The period immediately following 
liberalization is one in which risk is 
particularly marked, as markets 
often respond to the new opportuni- 
ties in an overly exuberant manner, 
as they see previously closed oppor- 
tunities opened up. The increased 
macro-economic risk would imply a 
necessity for increased monitoring of 
financial institutions, as the fran- 
chise value, the expected present dis- 
counted value of future profits, is 
likely to be eroded given the higher 
probability of an economic downturn; 
and in the absence of increased moni- 
toring, the higher level of risk taking 
itself would contribute to greater 
instability. Unfortunately, typically 
governments have not done a better 
job of regulation, for two reasons. 
Often, the capital market liberaliza- 
tion is in response to external pres- 
sure (e.g., from the IMF or the United 
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States), and that same pressure has 
been accompanied by pressure to lib- 
eralize financial markets, that is, 
remove restrictions that, in part, 
result in less exposure to risk (the 
elimination of Thailand's restric- 
tions on speculative real estate 
investments are a case in point). Sec- 
ond, the process of liberalization has 
been accompanied by huge increases 
in demand for the relatively few 
trained personnel, many of whom 
worked for the regulatory authorities 
and the central bank; the public sec- 
tor simply cannot compete in paying 
salaries against the private sector. 
Hence,just at the time when the need 
for improved regulation is greatest, 
the country's capacity is reduced (see 
Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz 
1996). 
Capital market flows to which cap- 
ital market liberalization gave rise 
are now recognized to be the pivotal 
factor in the East Asia crisis.6 But 
there have been more crises that 
have been deeper and longer lasting 
in the past quarter century-more 
than one hundred countries have 
been afflicted (see Caprio and 
Klingebiel 1996; Lindgren, Garcia, 
and Saal 1996), and it is apparent 
that the trend toward increased capi- 
tal and financial market liberaliza- 
tion has been a key factor. The IMF 
and U.S. Treasury suggested that the 
East Asian countries were vulnera- 
ble because of a number of structural 
failings; on the contrary, these coun- 
tries had performed better over the 
preceding three decades, not only in 
terms of growth but also in stability: 
two of the affected countries had had 
only one of economic downturn, two 
had had none, a better performance 
than any of the OECD countries. If 
they were vulnerable, it was a newly 
acquired vulnerability because of the 
capital and financial market liberal- 
ization that had been foisted on these 
countries. 
IMF responses exacerbated the 
risk. The nature of the response to a 
crisis affects the consequences, 
including who bears the burden. In 
the case of the East Asia crisis, the 
IMF responded with fiscal contrac- 
tions and monetary tightening, 
which deepened the economic down- 
turns and failed in their intended 
effects of sustaining the exchange 
rate. In addition, the restructuring 
strategy, which involved closing 
financial institutions (in the case of 
Indonesia, closing sixteen banks, 
with an announcement that more 
were to follow, but that depositors 
would not have their deposits guar- 
anteed, leading to a run on the bank- 
ing system), led to a further collapse 
in the supply of credit; and the more 
hands-off corporate restructuring 
strategies meant that corporate dis- 
tress was addressed at an extremely 
slow pace-four years after the crisis, 
between 25 and 40 percent of Thai 
loans remained nonperforming. 
The failure was predicted by econ- 
omists within the World Bank, and 
the reason was obvious: given the 
high leverage, the high interest rates 
forced many firms into distress and 
worsened the problems of the finan- 
cial institutions. The combination of 
the normal Keynesian demand-side 
and supply-side contractions proved 
devastating. Although at this junc- 
ture, the IMF admits several of the 
failures, on the critical issue of mone- 
tary policy it remains adamant. It 
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believes that higher interest rates 
lead to a capital inflow that supports 
a country's currency, evidently even 
in circumstances such as those of 
East Asia with high levels of lever- 
age, in spite of the absence of evi- 
dence in support and some evidence 
against and in spite of the over- 
whelming theoretical arguments 
against the policy. The statistical 
analyses of whether raising interest 
rates leads to higher exchange rates 
is even more problematic than the 
cross-country regressions referred to 
earlier. Here, the critical issue is to 
identify the appropriate counter- 
factual, that is, what would have hap- 
pened but for the policy. It is clear 
that the IMF interventions in East 
Asia, which included not only the 
high interest rates but also massive 
bailouts and contractionary fiscal 
policies, did not prevent a slide in the 
exchange rates; indeed, looking at 
exchange rate movements, it is hard 
to detect evidence of interventions 
having any positive impact. It is, of 
course, possible that the mistaken 
part of the IMF packages systemati- 
cally undermined the positive effects 
of the interest rate policies, or that 
just at the moment of the interven- 
tions, the pace of decline in exchange 
rate would have accelerated, and this 
acceleration was reversed by the 
interventions. But neither of these is 
plausible, and a more detailed analy- 
sis of interest rate increases in other 
crises does not suggest that they are 
very effective instruments (see 
Furman and Stiglitz 1998a). The the- 
oretical arguments put forward by 
the advocates of this policy are not 
compelling: the higher interest rates 
are supposed to attract funds into the 
country, bolstering the exchange 
rate. In fact, the economic disruption 
not only does not attract funds into 
the country but also leads to massive 
capital flight. Lenders care not just 
about the interest rate promised but 
also about the probability of being 
repaid; it was concern about default 
that led banks to refuse to roll over 
their loans. Thus, this was a variable 
of first-order importance-but left 
out from the IMF analyses. The poli- 
cies increased the probability of 
default so that the total impact was 
to make it less attractive to put funds 
into the country.7 
The important point is this: hav- 
ing failed to identify the reasons for 
their admitted failures in their fiscal 
and financial policies and having 
even refused to acknowledge the mis- 
takes in monetary policy means that 
in the future, the mistakes are likely 
to be repeated so that countries can 
anticipate facing major economic 
downturns in the event of a crisis. 
There are further aspects of IMF 
responses that exacerbated the 
downturn in Indonesia. Even in the 
best of circumstances, major eco- 
nomic downturns can give rise to 
political and social turmoil. In the 
case of ethnically fractionated societ- 
ies, such turmoil is even more likely 
(see, for instance, Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998). A perception that the 
burden is borne unfairly by the poor 
increases the likelihood of turmoil 
even more. I predicted in early 
December 1997 at a meeting of 
finance ministers and central bank 
officials at Kuala Lumpur that if the 
IMF maintained its macro-economic 
policies in Indonesia, there was a 
high probability of such turmoil 
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within six months. I argued that even 
if the IMF did not care about social 
costs, especially those borne by the 
poor, it was simply bad economic pol- 
icy. All that the head of the IMF, who 
was in attendance, could say in reply 
was that the country had to bear the 
pain. I was perhaps overly optimistic: 
riots, every bit as bad as my worse 
fears, broke out within five months. 
But I had not anticipated that just as 
the economy was plunged into 
depression, with unemployment 
soaring and real wages plummeting, 
food and fuel subsidies for the very 
poor would be cut back. Evidently, 
the IMF could provide billions to bail 
out Western banks and lenders, but 
there were not the measly millions 
required to finance subsidies for the 
very poor. The outrage was under- 
standable and the consequences long 
lasting: it will take years before that 
country recovers to its precrisis level. 
There were other aspects of IMF 
policies that exacerbated the down- 
turns. In East Asia, the debt was 
largely private. When private parties 
cannot meet their obligations, the 
normal mechanism by which the 
problem is handled is bankruptcy. 
(Sovereign defaults pose special 
problems, which is why it is impor- 
tant to note that the debt in East Asia 
was private. The governments them- 
selves had been running surpluses.) 
But the IMF was dead set against 
bankruptcy and facilitating the pro- 
cess of debt workout, for example, 
through a debt moratorium. Its first 
deputy managing director referred to 
bankruptcy as if it were an abroga- 
tion of the debt contract, failing to 
note that bankruptcy was at the core 
of modern capitalism and was an 
essential part of limited liability cor- 
porations. (Critics pointed out that 
while the IMF was willing to put up 
billions to preserve the sanctity of 
the debt contract, it was reluctant to 
put up the millions needed to pre- 
serve the social contract, for example, 
the food and fuel subsidies for the 
poor, and the social and economic 
consequences of the abrogation of the 
social contract were far more severe 
than the consequences of bankruptcy 
could possibly have been.) Bank- 
ruptcy (or a debt moratorium) would 
have relieved downward pressure on 
the exchange rate (see Miller and 
Stiglitz 1999)-indeed, it was only 
with the essentially forced rollover of 
Korea's debt that its exchange rate 
was stabilized. Those who opposed 
such policies said that it would be 
impossible to engineer them, but 
Korea showed that that was wrong. 
They argued that capital would not 
flow back into the country, and that 
was partially irrelevant, partially 
just wrong, both in terms of theory 
and evidence. Capital was not going 
to be flowing into these countries in 
the short run in any case. And the 
countries in East Asia, given their 
high savings rate, had little need for 
capital even in the longer run. But 
capital markets are forward looking: 
there is not a single participant who 
can decide to punish someone who 
does not obey his strictures. Rather, 
there are a multitude of participants, 
each of whom must decide on 
whether the return is sufficient to 
justify the risk. A country in deep 
recession, with a large overhang of 
debt, public and/or private, is less 
likely to attract funds than a country 
that has put the past behind it. More- 
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over, why should investors hold a 
new government to blame for mis- 
takes made by past governments; if 
anything, a new government that has 
rectified the problems of the past will 
gain in credibility. All of these pro- 
vide part of the reason that countries 
that default do regain access to inter- 
national capital markets, and often 
after a remarkably short time-per- 
haps more determined by the time it 
takes to restore economic stability 
and growth prospects than anything 
else. 
One country in the region took an 
alternative course; after first flirting 
with an IMF program without the 
IMF, Malaysia imposed capital con- 
trols. Its downturn was shorter, and 
it was left with less of a legacy of debt, 
as a result. In the next section, we 
shall explain why, but first, I want to 
discuss briefly some of the conse- 
quences of the increased risk, besides 
the adverse effect on growth that I 
have already discussed. 
The consequences of increased 
macro-economic risk. Normally, as 
countries go into a downturn, it is the 
poor who disproportionately bear 
those costs. Their unemployment 
rate goes up more,8 perhaps because 
employers value of the firm-specific 
human capital of the more skilled 
workers, and as their demand for la- 
bor decreases, they would rather re- 
deploy them to less skilled jobs 
rather than having them leave the 
firm. 
Less developed countries typically 
have limited safety nets. Even in 
developed countries, unemployment 
insurance in the self-employed and 
agricultural sectors is limited, and in 
developing countries, these sectors 
predominate. In some less developed 
countries, flexible labor markets 
imply that reductions in the demand 
for labor do not show up in the form of 
unemployment but are reflected in 
changes in real wages. But the reduc- 
tions in real wages may be very 
large-in some of the countries in 
East Asia, real wages fell by more 
than a quarter. 
One of the important arguments 
to emerge from the 2000 World De- 
velopment Report (World Bank 2000) 
is that the poor are not only 
adversely affected by lower incomes 
but also by higher insecurity. De- 
prived of the instruments with which 
to deal with economic volatility, their 
lives are particularly affected by the 
instability that is associated with 
capital market liberalization.9 
Moreover, extended periods of 
high unemployment and low wages 
can have a devastating effect in 
undermining social capital, the social 
fabric that enables a society, and a 
market economy, to function-wit- 
ness the increase in urban violence in 
Latin America following the debt cri- 
sis. Not only are there severe social 
consequences, but the social instabil- 
ity provides adverse conditions for 
investment and thus growth. 
The defenses 
Given the overwhelming theory 
and evidence against capital market 
liberalization, one might wonder, on 
what grounds did the IMF argue in 
its favor? While they refused to 
refute the arguments put forward 
above, in particular, never address- 
ing the issue of the impact of liberal- 
ization on the poor, they argued that 
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capital market liberalization en- 
hanced growth and actually reduced 
risk! 
Growth. Underlying the analysis 
is a simple analogy: free mobility of 
capital is like free mobility of goods; 
and just as free trade increases in- 
comes, so too does free mobility of 
capital. But capital markets are dis- 
tinctly different from goods markets. 
Risk and information are at the 
center of capital markets: capital 
markets are concerned with the ac- 
quisition, analysis, and dissemina- 
tion of information; with making 
choices about how to allocate of 
scarce capital to investment opportu- 
nities; and with spreading, sharing, 
and pooling risks. Markets for infor- 
mation are markedly different from 
markets for goods. While with perfect 
information and perfect risk, compet- 
itive markets are in general (pareto) 
efficient, with imperfect information 
and incomplete risk markets, mar- 
kets typically do not behave in the 
way predicted by standard competi- 
tive models, and market equilibrium 
is in general not (constrained pareto) 
efficient.10 Thus, while there may 
be some presumption that trade lib- 
eralization may be welfare improv- 
ing,"l there is little basis for 
presuming that liberalization in fi- 
nancial and capital markets is wel- 
fare improving.12 
There are two more specific argu- 
ments that the advocates of capital 
market liberalization put forward. 
One is patently wrong: that without 
capital market liberalization, coun- 
tries will not be able to attract the 
foreign direct investment, which is so 
important to economic growth. China 
has not liberalized its capital market, 
and yet has been able to attract more 
foreign investment than any other 
emerging market. 
The second is more subtle. It 
argues that capital market liberal- 
ization provides an important disci- 
pline device-countries that fail to 
pursue good policies are quickly pun- 
ished, and thus capital market liber- 
alization helps keep countries on a 
solid path of economic reform. 
Underlying this argument is a highly 
antidemocratic bias: the belief that 
democratic processes provide an 
inadequate check and the willing- 
ness to delegate discipline to foreign 
financial interests. But the argument 
is more problematic. If one is to 
choose an outside disciplinarian, one 
wants one that punishes one if and 
only if one has "misbehaved." But as 
many countries-for example, in 
Latin America-learned with great 
pain, with capital market liberaliza- 
tion, they can be punished even if 
they do everything "right." If emerg- 
ing markets fall from favor, in the 
inevitable vicissitudes that charac- 
terize capital markets, then even the 
countries that have been awarded A's 
from the IMF are punished. Equally 
bad, capital markets may have cer- 
tain biases-they may, in the first 
stance, overreact to certain actions a 
country undertakes and fail to react 
to other actions. 
This point may be highlighted by 
considering the consequences of dele- 
gating the responsibility of"discipli- 
narian" to labor markets. Labor mar- 
kets might discipline a country for 
following bad environmental policies 
with a rush of skilled labor out of a 
country should it decide, for instance, 
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to allow arsenic in its water supply. 
The choice of a disciplinarian deter- 
mines what a country is to be 
rewarded, or punished, for-and 
therefore affects what a country does 
or does not do. It affects the very 
nature of the evolution of society. 
Who gets to play the role of disci- 
plinarian is affected by mobility. 
Capital market liberalization does 
give capital markets more power, in 
this sense. And in doing so, it affects 
the ability of society to redistribute: 
any threat to increase the taxes on 
capital can result in quick retribu- 
tion in the form of the withdrawal of 
funds. Whether such funds contrib- 
ute to the long-term growth of the 
economy is not the issue: the with- 
drawal of funds can impose enor- 
mous costs, especially in the context 
of the IMF-style responses.l3 
Enhancing the mobility of capital 
thus has real consequences: it affects 
bargaining positions and the out- 
come of bargaining processes in ways 
that are advantageous to capital and 
disadvantageous to labor. 
The argument that capital market 
liberalization was good for growth 
was, to be sure, fairly unpersuasive 
in the context of the countries in East 
Asia, where domestic savings rates 
were very high. Although the coun- 
tries did an impressive job in invest- 
ing these savings productively, little 
argument could be put forward that 
additional funds from more devel- 
oped countries would substantially 
increase growth. 
In the face of this, the IMF and the 
U.S. Treasury used an even more 
peculiar argument. 
Risk. They argued that capital 
market liberalization would reduce 
risk, enabling countries to have ac- 
cess to outside funds in the face of a 
threatened economic slowdown. Di- 
versification of the source of funding 
would enhance economic stability. 
What was remarkable about this ar- 
gument was the overwhelming em- 
pirical evidence against it, even at 
the time it was put forward: short- 
term flows of funds are procyclical, 
exacerbating, not dampening, eco- 
nomic fluctuations. As the expression 
goes, bankers are most willing to pro- 
vide credit to those who do not need 
it; and as a country faces a downturn, 
bankers withdraw credit.14 
Externalities and 
capital controls 
Thus, today, there is widespread 
agreement that capital flows impose 
huge costs on others-on innocent 
bystanders, small businesses, and 
workers who neither participated in 
nor benefited from these flows. They 
impose huge externalities. Whenever 
there are externalities, there are 
standard remedies-government 
interventions-that can take a vari- 
ety of forms, for example, regulatory 
or tax. There is a large literature 
addressing the relative merits of var- 
ious forms of intervention.15 
One of the standard objections to 
these interventions is that they raise 
the cost of funds, especially short- 
term finds. But that objection is like 
the steel industry complaining that 
taxes on pollution will discourage the 
production of steel. It will-but that 
is precisely the point. Efficiency 
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requires that the marginal social cost 
of production equal the marginal 
social benefit; and the steel industry, 
in its private calculations, does not 
include the social cost of pollution. 
Once that is included, production 
should be reduced. So too, since there 
is a large social cost associated with 
short-term capital flows (and ques- 
tionable social benefits), these capi- 
tal flows should be discouraged. 
The battle of the metaphors. While 
the economic case for some form of in- 
tervention is compelling, opponents 
(and proponents) of intervention 
have often resorted to metaphors and 
false analogies to help "prove" their 
point. We have already disposed of 
one such: the argument that the free 
flow of capital is just like the free flow 
of goods; and just as free trade is wel- 
fare enhancing, so are free capital 
movements. 
One popular metaphor has 
involved the automobile. Critics of 
capital market liberalization have 
argued that capital market liberal- 
ization, at least for most developing 
countries, is like giving a teenage kid 
a high-powered car before making 
sure that the tires were in good con- 
dition and before installing seatbelts, 
let alone airbags. They noted that 
when there was an isolated accident 
on a highway, one might infer that 
the problem was with the driver, but 
when there were repeated pile-ups at 
the same bend in the highway, the 
problem was more likely with the 
design of the road. Supporters of cap- 
ital market liberalization responded 
that the appropriate response was to 
widen the highway, not to return to 
the days of the horse and buggy, and 
in the meanwhile, the drivers needed 
to be better trained. Critics respond- 
ed that roads and cars have to be 
designed for ordinary mortals; if only 
those with years of experience as 
racetrack drivers can survive, then 
something is fundamentally wrong. 
Moreover, they suggested that the 
only repair work on the road system 
that the international community 
had proposed was better road signs 
(improved information)-and even 
that initiative was halfhearted and 
incomplete, as the United States 
refused to allow the posting of signs 
at the most dangerous turns (disclos- 
ing information concerning the activ- 
ities of hedge funds and offshore 
banking centers). 
Another popular metaphor lik- 
ened small developing countries to 
small boats on a rough and wily sea. 
Even if well designed and well cap- 
tained, they are likely eventually to 
be hit broadside by a big wave and 
turned over. But the IMF program of 
capital market liberalization had set 
them forth into the most tempestu- 
ous parts of the sea, in boats that 
were leaky, without life vests or 
safety nets, and without training. 
Still a third metaphor involved 
aviation: the undersecretary of Trea- 
sury (who at one time, before he had 
taken up the job of representing Wall 
Street's interests, had argued that 
failing to regulate capital markets 
was like failing to regulate nuclear 
power plants-doing either was an 
invitation to disaster) used to argue 
that simply because planes occasion- 
ally crash was no reason to give up 
flying. But critics responded: but if a 
particular model of a plane consis- 
tently crashed, one would want to 
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ground it; and all governments take 
strong policies to ensure that those 
who fly planes are well trained, and 
those who fly more powerful planes 
have better training. And one cer- 
tainly wanted to be particularly care- 
ful in flying over territory where the 
terrain was particularly rough since 
the dangers of a crash landing 
were then particularly severe, and 
even more so if the inhabitants in 
the territory had a penchant for 
cannibalism. 
The metaphors, of course, were 
hardly a substitute for deeper eco- 
nomic analysis. But, especially when 
accompanied by such an analysis, 
they helped bring home the concerns 
and the depth of passions, on both 
sides. For instance, the fact that, as 
Paul Volcker, former governor of the 
Federal Reserve Bank, emphasized, 
the total stock market of a country 
like Thailand was smaller in size 
than a medium-sized American com- 
pany like Home Depot, and that even 
when well managed, such companies 
experience huge volatility in their 
market value, brought home the 
point that the developing countries 
were like small boats on a rough sea. 
Analytic studies showing that most 
of the shocks that developing coun- 
tries experience were external- 
caused, for instance, by sudden 
changes in investor sentiment in the 
more developed countries, having 
nothing to do with the particular pol- 
icies and events in their particular 
country-provided the answer to the 
charge that the problems were of the 
country's own making; and by the 
time the East Asian crisis of 1997 
had become the global financial crisis 
of 1998, touching even the best 
managed of developing countries, it 
had become clear that the rhetoric 
blaming the countries of East Asia 
for the crisis had been largely self- 
serving. By the same token, the pri- 
vately financed but government 
engineered bailout of the world's 
largest hedge fund, Long Term Man- 
agement Corporation, on the 
grounds that the failure of this one 
firm would exacerbate markedly the 
global financial crisis, provided the 
answer to the IMF study arguing 
that speculative hedge funds did not 
play an important role in the 1997 
crisis, partly because they were sim- 
ply too small to do so-and further 
undermined the credibility of those 
who claimed that capital market lib- 
eralization had little to do with the 
instability. The sad fact, though, was 
that advocates of capital market lib- 
eralization had forced developing 
countries to liberalize, without any 
analytic basis showing that it would 
be good for growth, ignoring the the- 
ory and evidence that it imposed 
enormous risks, without a clear set of 
guidelines for the circumstances in 
which countries might be able to bear 
those risks, and without a set of pre- 
scriptions for how they might pre- 
pare themselves appropriately for 
dealing with them. 
The purposes of interventions 
Having established that, in princi- 
ple, some form of intervention is 
desirable, the next natural question 
is, are there forms of intervention 
where the benefits exceed the costs, 
that is, there are not ancillary costs 
that more than offset the benefits, or 
in which evasion is not so large that 
the benefits are largely eroded? 
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Interventions by Chile, Malaysia, 
and China, among others, showed 
that at least some countries could 
manage such interventions well and 
that they could take on a variety of 
forms. These countries demonstrated 
that these interventions need not 
hinder economic growth-or even 
the ability of a country to attract for- 
eign funds-but they could help 
ensure economic stability. Before dis- 
cussing the alternative interven- 
tions, it is desirable to describe the 
multiple purposes that such inter- 
ventions might serve. 
Stabilizing capital flows. The on- 
rush of short-term capital into a 
country poses two problems: first, it 
can result in inflationary pressures; 
and second, such money can leave a 
country just as fast as it can enter, 
leaving in its wake economic devas- 
tation. On purpose of intervention is 
to stabilize the flows. Note that inter- 
ventions designed for this purpose 
(or several of the other purposes de- 
scribed below) do not have to be per- 
fect to be effective. Two metaphors 
bring this point home: a leaky um- 
brella can still be useful in a thunder- 
storm; even if one gets damp, it is 
better than being drenched. The pur- 
pose of a dam is not to stop the flow of 
water from the melting of snow from 
the mountaintop to the ocean but 
merely to stabilize it; without the 
dam, the onrush of water can cause 
death and destruction; the dam can 
convert this natural disaster into a 
source of water for food and suste- 
nance. Even with a good dam, there 
can be spillage; some of the water can 
go around the dam. Even if it does not 
stop every flood, it can contribute 
greatly to increased well-being. 
Most of the well-known ways of 
avoiding many forms of capital mar- 
ket controls (discussed below) do not 
undermine the ability of such inter- 
ventions to stabilize flows, for most of 
the evasion tactics (e.g., under- and 
overinvoicing) work slowly. They are 
more like the flows of water going 
around the dam; in the long run, the 
aggregate amounts may be signifi- 
cant, but in the short run, the flows 
are still moderate, and it is the huge 
flows that cause the problem. 
Dampening the rush of capital out 
of a country. In the event of a crisis, 
there may be an irrational pessi- 
mism, matching the irrational exu- 
berance that brought the capital into 
the country. Policies designed to 
make it more difficult or more costly 
for capital to leave a country slow the 
rush of capital out; and, like the cir- 
cuit breakers that have been put into 
stock markets, the extra "pause for 
reflection" can have large positive ef- 
fects. Before they fully work out 
mechanisms for avoiding the con- 
trols, matters are seen in a calmer 
light-and markets themselves may 
have calmed down. 
Designing more effective and lower 
cost stabilization measures for the 
economy. In simple models, where 
there is free flow of capital, there is 
little scope for monetary policy. A de- 
crease in interest rates leads to a 
rush of capital out of the country. 
Thus, governments must rely on 
costly fiscal policy measures to stim- 
ulate the economy in the event of an 
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economic downturn. If, however, 
there are effective restrictions on 
short-term capital movements, then 
monetary policy can be used. This 
has benefits both in the short run and 
the long, as Malaysia so forcefully 
showed. Reliance on fiscal policy 
forces governments to have large def- 
icits, which can put a damper on fu- 
ture growth. Financing the deficit is 
also problematic in countries with 
limited access to foreign borrowing. 
Government borrowings crowd out 
private investment, with the net af- 
fect on recovery limited. At the high 
interest rates, lending to firms be- 
comes particularly risky (Stiglitz- 
Weiss 1981), and banks prefer what 
they perceive to be relatively safe 
loans to government. In countries 
where many firms have high lever- 
age, the high interest rates induce 
massive corporate distress, weaken- 
ing the banking system and reducing 
its ability to lend even more. The cost 
to the public of resolving the corpo- 
rate and financial stress is all the 
larger, again with adverse effects on 
the country's future growth. 
Providing greater scope for 
redistributive taxation. The irony is 
that while short-term capital im- 
poses enormous costs on society, the 
ability of a country to tax such capi- 
tal, should it become fixated on keep- 
ing it, is limited. This is a reflection of 
a general principle in taxation: gov- 
ernments can impose only limited 
taxes as factors whose supply is 
highly elastic. Capital market liber- 
alization, in effect, enhances the elas- 
ticity of supply, thereby lowering the 
scope for redistribution. As a second 
irony, the fact that short-term capital 
increases economic volatility means 
that the return that it must receive- 
to compensate it for the risks that it 
itself has caused-is higher. Hence, 
capital market liberalization can 
drive up the before-tax returns at the 
same time that it reduces the scope 
for taxation. 
Preventing massive capital out- 
flows. The rush of capital out of Rus- 
sia has played an important role in 
the economic demise of that country; 
China's investing its huge savings in- 
side the country has similarly been 
critical in its success. With open capi- 
tal markets, the oligarchs in Russia 
were posed with a simple choice: 
where in the world to invest their 
wealth-whether in Russia, which 
was going into a prolonged depres- 
sion of an almost unprecedented 
scale, or in the United States (say), 
which was, at the time, experiencing 
one of the strongest expansions in its 
history, with a stock market boom to 
match? The fact that the wealth of 
the oligarchs was widely perceived to 
be ill-gotten, based on political con- 
nections in a process of privatization 
without political legitimacy, and 
therefore (rightly perceived) subject 
to be reversed in a subsequent ad- 
ministration only reinforced the wis- 
dom of taking the money out of the 
country. And as each oligarch (and 
smaller investors) decided to do so, it 
made it more desirable for others do 
so. 
Although of all the objectives of 
intervention listed, this may be the 
most difficult to achieve, the analysis 
above suggests that even when the 
purpose is discouraging long-term 
capital outflows, the interventions 
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may be effective even when there are 
ways of circumventing them. This is 
because there may be multiple equi- 
libria; if most people keep their 
money in the economy, it grows, and 
it becomes attractive for others to do 
so. Conversely, if most people pull 
their money out of the country, it 
becomes attractive for others to do so. 
The restrictions on capital outflows 
can "force" the economy to the "good" 
equilibrium, and once there, it is self- 
sustaining. 
The forms and mechanisms 
of interventions 
Intervention has taken on a num- 
ber of different forms and been 
implemented through a number of 
different mechanisms. Some of these 
rely more on "market mechanisms" 
that are both more flexible and that 
avoid the opprobrium associated 
with the term controls 
Taxes on capital inflows. For a long 
time, Chile had an effective system of 
what amounted in effect to a tax on 
short-term capital inflows. (A third of 
the money coming into Chile had to 
be deposited in the central bank for a 
year at a zero-interest rate; hence, 
the first-year return was taxed, in ef- 
fect, at 33 percent.) The tax rate could 
vary with economic circumstances- 
discouraging inflows more when they 
seemed to pose a greater problem. In 
principle, a subsidy could be provided 
if the government wished to encour- 
age an inflow. 
At the same time, the tax on 
inflows discouraged speculative out- 
flows: an investor worried about the 
possibility of a small devaluation 
would not find it attractive to take 
his money out of the country over- 
night to bring it back in again the 
next day, for there was a large effec- 
tive tax on such a roundtrip. There 
was little evidence that the tax dis- 
couraged overall inflows, but it 
lengthened the maturity of funds, 
thus stabilizing the economy. Chile 
was, of course, adversely affected by 
the global financial crisis, as were all 
countries, and especially countries 
heavily dependent on commodity 
exports. No one believed that it 
would eliminate all sources of insta- 
bility. In the aftermath of the crisis, 
as funds for emerging markets dried 
up everywhere, Chile decided that 
the problem was not a surfeit of funds 
but a lack of funds, and hence the tax 
was reduced to zero. 
Controls on capital outflows. In 
the uncertainty of the early days of 
the global financial crisis following 
Russia's default, Malaysia responded 
by imposing controls on capital out- 
flows. It noted high levels of specula- 
tive activity on the ringit, especially 
occurring in Singapore, and worried 
that such speculation would de- 
stabilize the economy. The controls 
were carefully designed to ensure 
that those who had invested long 
term in the country would be able to 
take their profits out. And they were 
announced as short term, to be re- 
moved within a year. The vituper- 
ativeness with which these controls 
were greeted was almost unprece- 
dented, not only from the IMF, the 
self-appointed guardian of capital 
market liberalization, but also from 
the U.S. Treasury. They forecast that 
the controls would be ineffective; 
that the country would never be able 
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to attract capital; that they would be 
counterproductive, exacerbating the 
economic downturn; that they would 
never be removed; and that without 
the discipline of capital markets, the 
country would never address its 
problems. Their forecasts were as far 
from the mark and as based on ideol- 
ogy and interests as their earlier ad- 
vocacy of capital market liberaliza- 
tion had been. Just as Malaysia had 
once before imposed capital controls 
in an emergency and removed them 
as promised, so too did it fulfill its 
commitment. Its downturn was 
shorter than any of the other coun- 
tries,16 and the country was left with 
less of a legacy of indebtedness. (See 
the discussion in the preceding sec- 
tion.) It did use the time well to re- 
structure, with a program that was 
far more effective than that of its 
neighbor, who remained under IMF 
tutelage. Capital (foreign direct in- 
vestment) continued to flow into the 
country.7 
The World Bank worked with 
Malaysia to convert the controls into 
an exit tax, with the tax rate gradu- 
ally lowered. The result was that 
when the controls (taxes) were 
finally removed, there was no distur- 
bance to the market: it was a virtu- 
ally seamless change. 
Bank regulations. Today, increas- 
ingly, capital controls are imple- 
mented through bank regulations, 
which limit not only the (uncovered) 
foreign exchange exposure of banks 
but also of the firms to which they 
lend. Since most financial transac- 
tions are intermediated through 
banks and most domestic firms bor- 
row at home as well as abroad, these 
regulations can be highly effective. 
Even before the crisis, Malaysia had 
succeeded in limiting the foreign ex- 
change exposure of its banks. 
Such changes can be implemented 
either through direct regulations or 
through more price-based mecha- 
nisms, for example, through deposit 
insurance systems where the premia 
increase with risk and where the for- 
eign exchange exposure of the bank 
(direct and indirect) is included in 
the risk measure, or through risk 
adjusted capital adequacy require- 
ments, again where foreign exchange 
exposure is included in the risk 
measure. 
Taxes. Many countries have indi- 
vidual and corporate income tax sys- 
tems that allow the deduction of 
interest payments. By disallowing 
the deduction of interest on short- 
term foreign denominated debt, 
households and firms would be pro- 
vided with an incentive not to under- 
take such debt.18 
EXCHANGE RATE 
REGIMES AND CAPITAL 
MARKET CONTROLS 
So far, we have argued that capital 
controls increase risk but do not 
increase growth. We have elided the 
question of the extent to which these 
results are dependent on the ex- 
change rate regime. In this section, 
we shall argue that in the absence of 
capital controls, the only exchange 
rate regimes that, in practice, can 
work effectively are floating ex- 
change rates or dollarization, but 
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that even with floating exchange rate 
systems, capital controls can en- 
hance economic stability. 
Why fixed exchange 
rate systems fail 
without capital controls 
A major failing of fixed exchange 
rate systems is their vulnerability to 
speculative attack, especially when 
there is a perception that the 
exchange rate is overvalued and can- 
not be sustained. Countries are not 
given the grace of a gradual adjust- 
ment. When there is not sufficient 
reserves to back up the demands for 
dollars, then there can be a run on the 
currency,just as there can be a run on 
a bank when there is not sufficient 
reserves available to meet its liabili- 
ties (see Diamond and Dybvig 1983). 
If all creditors and potential claim- 
ants believed that the country could 
meet its obligations, then, of course, 
they would not wish to "cash in," to 
pull their funds out of the country; 
but if they believe that the exchange 
rate is not sustainable and will crash, 
the returns to doing so are enormous. 
They can pull their funds out today, 
putting them back in tomorrow, and 
make an enormous return from the 
speculative activity. 
The problem is that the amount of 
reserves required to ensure that a 
country can meet its commitment to 
maintain the exchange rate is enor- 
mous under full capital market liber- 
alization: it equals the total value of 
the money supply plus short-term, 
foreign-denominated credit, for any 
domestic currency can be converted 
into dollars on demand. In short, the 
country has to have a fully backed 
currency-equivalent to the 
elimination of fiat money. In effect, 
then, a country with full capital mar- 
ket liberalization surrenders control 
over its money supply and monetary 
policy. The consequences are not only 
that the government cannot engage 
in stabilizing macro-policy, but also 
there may actually be a destabilizing 
dynamic put into place. 
Assume, for instance, its firms 
decide to borrow more abroad. It 
must then increase reserves or take 
strong actions to discourage such for- 
eign borrowing. Assume that the 
mantra is that the country not only 
cannot control the capital inflows, 
but it cannot tax them or the uses to 
which the funds are put. Then, if it 
wishes to add to reserves, it will put 
downward pressure on the exchange 
rate. But given that it is committed to 
maintaining the exchange rate at its 
fixed level, it must offset this pres- 
sure by increasing the interest rate. 
It might well justify that measure 
further by noting that it dampens the 
inflationary pressures that are often 
associated with the capital inflows. 
But this induces domestic firms that 
expect the government to fulfill its 
commitment to a fixed exchange rate 
to borrow even more abroad, espe- 
cially if foreign borrowing is being, in 
effect, encouraged by the foreign 
lenders, as was the case in East Asia. 
(The Basle capital adequacy stan- 
dards provide preferential risk treat- 
ment for short-term lending, and the 
underregulation of the undercapital- 
ized Japanese banks provided them 
with an incentive to engage in risky 
lending.19) There is thus a vicious cir- 
cle, one that can easily lead to mas- 
sive distortions of resource alloca- 
tion, as in the case of Thailand: the 
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foreign lending goes into areas that 
are collateralizable, feeds a specula- 
tive real estate boom, while the high 
interest rates meanwhile choke off 
more valuable domestic invest- 
ment.20 It made little sense to build 
empty office buildings in Bangkok 
and Jakarta when there were 
other investments that would have 
enhanced the growth prospects and 
job opportunities. Yet, that is what 
happened under deregulation. 
There is an alternative strategy 
that few countries have followed. To 
discourage foreign borrowing, the 
country can make loans available at 
more attractive terms to domestic 
borrowers. One argument holds that 
lowering interest rates to domestic 
borrowers will lead to lower deposit 
rates and a possible flow of money 
out of the country. This argument, 
while often mentioned, is unpersua- 
sive: the objective was to stem an 
excess flow of foreign borrowing, and 
there must exist a "fixed point," a 
level of interest rates that attracts 
the desired level of capital. 
But there is another argument 
that is somewhat more compelling. 
The lower interest rate will normally 
lead to an increased level of domestic 
investment and hence possibly con- 
tribute to inflationary pressures. In 
effect, a country in such a situation is 
forced to cut back on public expendi- 
tures or increase taxes in response to 
an onslaught of foreign capital, no 
matter whether that onslaught is 
based on irrational exuberance or 
not. If such policies had been pursued 
in Thailand, investments in empty 
office buildings would have crowded 
out higher return investments in 
education or infrastructure or forced 
politically unpalatable increases in 
taxes-in a country already running 
a fiscal surplus. 
(There is still a third alternative 
strategy, from which the countries 
were discouraged under the doc- 
trines of liberalization, and that is 
micro-economic interventions, such 
as taxing real estate capital gains.) 
The dynamic is worse than just 
described: If the monetary and fiscal 
measures designed to maintain the 
exchange rate do not, at the same 
time, perfectly offset any inflationary 
pressures, then the capital inflow 
may well lead to a real appreciation, 
leading to a trade deficit. (In some 
sense, the trade deficit is the inevita- 
ble accompaniment of the capital 
inflow, and the trade deficit will 
typically21 be generated by a real 
appreciation.) But the increasingly 
large trade deficit, under standard 
doctrines and models, will be viewed 
as "unsustainable." That is, markets 
may increasingly anticipate a correc- 
tion in the overvalued exchange rate, 
a correction more likely to occur 
through a sudden change in the 
exchange rate than in adjustments in 
wages and prices. 
The fact of the matter is that few 
governments have been willing to 
maintain high-cost reserves equal to 
their money supply and foreign- 
denominated short-term indebted- 
ness, and short of that, the countries 
will be vulnerable to a speculative 
attack. Even the massive amount of 
money that the IMF has been able to 
mobilize in recent crises is not 
enough to fill the gap and therefore to 
maintain confidence in the overval- 
ued exchange rate. 
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But the fact that the IMF has engi- 
neered massive (and typically unsuc- 
cessful) bailouts has exacerbated the 
overall problem in three distinct 
ways. First, in effect, the IMF has fed 
the speculative sharks (though the 
cost is borne by the taxpayers in the 
developing country). In the absence 
of outside funds, speculation is a 
zero-sum game, with some specula- 
tors gaining at the expense of others. 
The IMF engineered bailouts convert 
what would be a zero-sum game into 
a positive-sum game for speculators: 
they stand to gain at the expense of 
taxpayers, and they have indeed 
gained handsomely. Second, the 
funds have facilitated the bailout of 
creditors, generating the moral- 
hazard problem-lenders do not bear 
the full costs of their lending deci- 
sions (even ignoring the macro- 
economic externality). IMF econo- 
mists (including their chief econo- 
mist, Michael Mussa) have argued 
that the lenders have borne some 
costs, but that is not the point: moral- 
hazard problems arise whenever 
they do not bear the full costs, and 
this they clearly have not. Third, the 
IMF efforts to sustain the exchange 
rate (even if only partially success- 
ful), and the rhetoric that, otherwise, 
borrowers who have borrowed in for- 
eign denominations will be hurt, 
have led to a "foreign exchange cover 
moral hazard." Private borrowers 
have felt that they do not need to buy 
insurance against the risk of devalu- 
ation or as much insurance as they 
otherwise would, and in this they are 
right: when enough of them take that 
position, the IMF will use that fact to 
help support the exchange rate. They 
are willing to force small firms to 
bear the costs through high interest 
rates to save those that should have 
purchased insurance. Doing so, it 
could be argued, is not only contrib- 
uting to a moral-hazard problem but 
to a moral problem. 
The arguments put forward for 
fixed exchange rate systems apply 
with equal force to controlled 
exchange rate systems, for example, 
where the exchange rate is allowed to 
move within a well-defined band. 
When it becomes apparent that the 
band cannot be sustained, there will 
be a speculative attack. 
Dollarization. While capital mar- 
ket liberalization has thus made 
fixed exchange rate systems of the 
conventional kind untenable, it has 
enhanced the argument for 
dollarization, in which the country 
gives up control over its money sup- 
ply. Under standard criteria, Argen- 
tina and the United States, or 
Ecuador and the United States, do 
not constitute an optimal currency 
area (see Mundell 1961). But 
Mundell (1961) wrote his classic arti- 
cle before capital market liberaliza- 
tion was the vogue. The shocks facing 
Ecuador and the United States are 
markedly different, and giving up 
conventional monetary policy in- 
struments will impair the ability 
to stabilize the economy. But the 
alternative-allowing the country to 
be buffeted by speculative exchange 
rate movements-may be even 
worse, and even with dollarization, 
there may be some scope for mone- 
tary policy (see Stiglitz 2001b). 
Volatility among the major cur- 
rency areas. Dollarization, however, 
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is not really a viable solution for 
countries engaged in trade with 
many different countries, for exam- 
ple, Japan, Europe, and the United 
States, simply because of the huge 
volatility of the exchange rates 
among their currencies. Fixing the 
exchange rate to the dollar means 
that firms face enormous risks in the 
exchange rate with Japan and Eu- 
rope. In short, there really is no such 
thing as a fixed exchange rate, only 
an exchange rate that is fixed in 
terms of one of the many currencies 
that the country interacts with. Sta- 
bilizing on a basket of exchange rates 
does not solve the problem of particu- 
lar firms. It leaves a firm that exports 
in the dollar zone, or imports from 
the yen zone, or imports from one 
zone and exports to another, bearing 
enormous risk. It does a firm little 
good to know that on average, ex- 
change rates are stable, if it faces 
bankruptcy, because imports have 
undermined it. Today, small coun- 
tries around the world have to face 
this challenge in risk management: 
there is nothing they can do about 
this volatility. But given the high 
level of risk that they have to manage 
in any case, the burden of managing 
the additional risk posed by short- 
term speculative capital flows in the 
absence of capital controls is all the 
greater. 
Flexible exchange rates 
Some critics of Thailand suggest 
that the problems it faced in the East 
Asia crisis lie with the fixed exchange 
rate system, but that contention is 
wrong (See Furman and Stiglitz 
1998a). Had the exchange rate been 
allowed to adjust, it would have 
appreciated, increasing the trade 
deficit, distorting the economy 
through that channel. When the col- 
lapse came, it might have even been 
worse, simply because the fall in the 
exchange rate would have been from 
a higher, more overvalued level. 
Some argue that investors were 
lulled by the seemingly fixed 
exchange rate to take a more exposed 
position than they otherwise would 
have, but this argument is unpersua- 
sive on two grounds. First, prudent 
behavior required the purchase of 
insurance, and insurance markets 
are particularly well designed (in 
principle) for handling the risks asso- 
ciated with fixed exchange rate sys- 
tems-small probability events with 
large consequences. There never has 
been a truly fixed exchange rate sys- 
tem; fixed exchange rate systems 
only mean that adjustments occur in 
large steps but infrequently. If the 
market shared the investors' percep- 
tions that the probability of an 
adjustment was small, then the 
insurance premium would have been 
correspondingly small. Thus, the fail- 
ure to obtain cover, exposing them- 
selves and the country to large risk, 
was as much, or more, a case of mar- 
ket failure than of government fail- 
ure, of markets either being irratio- 
nal (investors believing that they 
know better than the market, as 
reflected in insurance premia, about 
the future course of exchange rates) 
or inefficient, with the cost of cover 
being excessively high relative to the 
risk being divested. Second, there 
have been "crashes"-rapid changes 
in asset prices-in "flexible"-price 
markets as there have been in fixed- 
price markets. 
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With flexible exchange rates, 
there are high costs of the absence of 
capital controls, especially given the 
imperfections of risk markets.22 
Changes in speculative attitudes, 
say, toward the exchange rate, can 
force the exchange rate up or down, 
imposing huge problems for export- 
ers and those in import competing 
sectors, or even to domestic produc- 
ers relying on imported inputs. 
Typically, neither the producers nor 
consumers can divest themselves of 
the resulting large risks. Especially 
in the presence of imperfections of 
capital markets,23 the costs of such 
risks can be enormous: workers, 
underprotected by social safety nets, 
cannot borrow against the prospect 
of future income; firms may be forced 
to shut down, with an enormous loss 
of firm-specific human capital and 
organizational capital. And the 
anticipation of such costs will make 
investment in the country less 
attractive. Even when there are 
futures and forward markets, they 
extend only to a limited extent into 
the future, not enough to deal with 
the risks associated with long-term 
real investments. 
Macro-stability. The huge volatil- 
ity in exchange rates provides real 
challenges (to put it mildly) on those 
responsible for macro-stability, espe- 
cially if traditional IMF/central bank 
responses are employed. A loss of 
confidence in the currency will lead 
depreciation. If true free-market 
principles were adhered to, so that 
the government simply allowed the 
exchange rate to be whatever the 
market determined, then the govern- 
ment would simply have to apprise 
the adverse real balance effect of 
firms and households that were net 
foreign debtors, the positive real bal- 
ance effect of those who were net 
creditors, and the positive effect on 
net exports (taking into account the 
dynamics of adjustment). Fiscal and 
monetary policy could freely be used 
to adjust the level and composition of 
output, either increasing or decreas- 
ing the extent of devaluation. (To be 
sure, the calculations of the appropri- 
ate policies would be complicated not 
only by the dynamics of adjustment 
but also by the complexity of expecta- 
tion formation. But these are details 
that need not detain us here.) 
In practice, the IMF has seldom 
allowed governments the freedom 
just described. It has worried that 
devaluations would lead to inflation, 
it has inveighed against what it 
describes as competitive devalua- 
tions (never mind that such devalua- 
tions are effectively typically aimed 
at changing the exchange rates 
against the dollar, not just at gaining 
a competitive edge over similar coun- 
tries), and it has worried that with 
devaluation, those who owe money 
abroad in dollars would not be able to 
meet their obligations or lead to con- 
tagion. While in other spheres, it has 
taken a strong promarket line, in this 
area, it has talked about overshoot- 
ing;24 but it has never provided a 
coherent explanation for why over- 
shooting should be more prevalent in 
this market than in other asset mar- 
kets, why government interven- 
tion-and, in effect, government sub- 
sidies-should be more acceptable in 
this market than in other markets, or 
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why the interventions should be lim- 
ited to the particular kinds of inter- 
vention (high interest rates, fiscal 
contraction, direct exchange rate 
support) that it favors. Their argu- 
ments have rung an increasingly hol- 
low note: the large devaluations asso- 
ciated the global financial crisis did 
not set off inflationary spirals; 
Brazil's large devaluation did not 
lead to contagion; the bankruptcies 
that marked East Asia were as much 
a result of the high interest rate and 
contractionary fiscal policies put in 
place to stave off a devaluation than 
to the devaluation itself (though to be 
sure, the devaluation had a greater 
impact on the foreign creditors, the 
clientele of the IMF, while the high 
interest rates had a greater impact 
on domestic creditors, which seem- 
ingly were of little direct concern). 
Adjustments in exchange rates in 
other noncrisis countries, like Tai- 
wan, followed along the lines of the 
crisis countries: there was no compet- 
itive devaluation, just an exchange 
rate adjustment. Most tellingly, care- 
ful micro-studies, for example, of 
Thailand, showed that the seeming 
worry about the impact of devalua- 
tion on the economy was largely 
bogus and certainly of second order 
compared to the adverse conse- 
quences of the high interest rates 
and excessive fiscal contraction. 
Those with large foreign indebted- 
ness were largely in the real estate 
sector and already dead; further 
devaluation would not make them 
any deader, and arresting the devalu- 
ation would not lead to a revival of 
this sector. The second most heavily 
indebted group were exporters, who 
would, on the whole, gain more from 
the devaluation in terms of exports 
than they would lose on their balance 
sheets.25 
But those who come under the 
sway of the IMF have to respond to 
the devaluation by interest rate 
increases and fiscal contractions, 
which lead to recession and, in some 
cases, depression. Indeed, the basic 
framework, which has come to be 
called "beggar-thy-self policies," is 
designed to bring about an economic 
downturn-and to bring with it 
adverse contagion to neighbors. A 
common (but not universal) charac- 
teristic of the precrisis situation is a 
trade deficit.26 Countries are told to 
redress the deficit; the resulting sur- 
plus facilitates the ability to repay its 
creditors. But given that devalua- 
tions are discouraged, tariff and 
other barriers to imports are not 
allowed, and exports cannot be 
increased overnight; the only way to 
do so is to decrease incomes-cause a 
recession-which reduces imports. 
Trading partners, of course, do not 
care much about why their exports 
are down; all they know is that they 
have fallen. The downturn in one 
country is thus transmitted to its 
neighbors, just as in the beggar-thy- 
neighbor policies that played such an 
important role in the propagation of 
the Great Depression. But these poli- 
cies do not even have the saving 
grace of helping the domestic econ- 
omy as they hurt those of trading 
partners. Thus, countries with capi- 
tal market liberalization (under 
fixed or flexible exchange rates) that 
have their responses to large varia- 
tions in capital flows dictated by the 
IMF are likely to find themselves 
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confronting the consequences of 
large economic downturns. 
In short, with fixed exchange rates 
and full capital market liberalzation, 
the government absorbs some of the 
costs that the huge movements in 
short-term capital impose under 
flexible exchange rates; but the gov- 
ernment's ability to do so is limited. If 
it wishes to do so, it must bear huge 
costs, both in terms of the size of 
reserves that have to be maintained 
and in terms of its loss of ability to 
maintain macro-economic stability. 
But with flexible exchange rates, full 
capital market liberalization im- 
poses enormous risks on firms, and 
while there are macro-policies that 
may do a reasonable job of offsetting 
the effects, ensuring a modicum of 
macro-stability, in practice, countries 
are likely to face significant macro- 
instability under these exchange 
rate regimes as well. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Developing countries differ from 
more developed countries in many 
ways, besides the lower level of 
incomes. In particular, they face 
greater economic volatility and a 
lower ability to manage that volatil- 
ity, even though they may have more 
flexible wages and labor markets 
than more developed countries (see 
Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz 2000). 
Capital market liberalization in- 
creases the risks they face-under 
any exchange rate regime, although 
it may enhance the arguments for 
flexible exchange rates. Given the 
absence of evidence that it promotes 
growth, given the compelling theo- 
retical arguments that it may 
actually have adverse effects on 
growth, and given the theory and evi- 
dence that it enhances economic 
instability, one might well ask, how 
could an international body, the IMF, 
founded to promote global economic 
stability be so active in promoting it, 
going so far as to seek a change in its 
charter to mandate it? 
A full answer to this would take us 
well beyond the scope of this article: a 
mixture of bad economics (using old 
macro-economic models that simply 
failed to incorporate in a meaningful 
way finance, although this has been 
one of the major areas of advance in 
economic theory in the past quarter 
century27), ideology, and special 
interests: financial markets would 
gain from the opening up of new mar- 
kets, and American financial mar- 
kets wanted them to be opened up 
quickly, before others were in a posi- 
tion to take advantage of these new 
opportunities; and the free-market 
ideology served these interests well 
(even if there was a note of intellec- 
tual incoherence in free-marketers 
asking the government to use its 
power to force others to open up their 
markets and in defending multi- 
billion dollar bailouts for Western 
creditors). But the lack of transpar- 
ency with which the IMF operates 
exacerbates these problems: its poli- 
cies were not subject to the kinds of 
intensive scrutiny that should be the 
hallmark of democratic processes, 
simply because much of what it does 
goes on behind closed doors, with 
public announcements coming too 
late for meaningful inputs from other 
stakeholders. Secrecy is the hall- 
mark of financial markets, and the 
IMF has borrowed its culture from 
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those it has sought to serve, with 
whom it interacts constantly, and 
from whom it draws so much of its 
personnel. 
But underlying all of these prob- 
lems is governance: to whom the 
institution is accountable. With vot- 
ing rights allocated according to mar- 
ket power at the end of World War II, 
with some adjustments since then, 
with finance ministries and central 
banks speaking for the governments, 
with other stakeholders precluded from 
having a seat at the table, the policies 
pushed by the IMF become under- 
standable but no more acceptable.28 
Capital market liberalization rep- 
resents a major change in the rules of 
the game. It was a change in the rules 
that did not serve the interests of the 
developing countries well. The fun- 
damental problem facing globaliza- 
tion is how these rules of the game 
are made. Dissatisfaction with the 
current system is well deserved. 
Notes 
1. Interestingly, many in the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) claimed that they 
never had really pushed for capital market lib- 
eralization for countries that were unpre- 
pared. At best, this was a semantic quibble: al- 
though they had often accompanied their 
demands for capital market liberalization by 
demands for other reforms, they had never 
said not to go forward with capital market lib- 
eralization until those other reforms were 
made. 
2. With even the U.S. secretary of treasury 
joining the attack, it was not left just to the 
normal bureaucratic processes. 
3. The most notorious example involved 
the newly appointed managing director giving 
a speech in Bangkok, in which he reflected 
some of the new thinking in the fund concern- 
ing the risks of capital market liberalization. 
By the time he reached Jakarta, the Indone- 
sians already were discussing ways by which 
the new thinking might be reflected in prac- 
tice. But by then, the IMF staff had reportedly 
gotten to their new managing director, and 
there was quick backtracking: it was put to the 
Indonesians in no uncertain terms that going 
back on capital market liberalization was not 
to be part of their economic agenda. 
4. See below for a more extended discus- 
sion of the Thai case. 
5. The only possible justification might be 
that banks in the United States do a better job 
at allocating scarce funds in the developing 
country, so much better that income in the 
country is higher than it would otherwise have 
been. There is no evidence in support of this 
position. 
6. See Furman and Stiglitz (1998a) and 
Rodrik and Velasco (2000). To be sure, other 
factors played a role, some of which are de- 
scribed below. 
7. There were deeper failings in their ar- 
guments: they seemed to believe that a tempo- 
rary intervention in the market would lead to 
a permanent shift in the demand functions, for 
example, for investment. The mechanism by 
which this might occur, other than through 
some vague appeal to the intervention result- 
ing in a restoration of confidence, were never 
spelled out. There was no systematic analysis 
of investor psychology (with empirical support 
for the maintained hypotheses), nor was there 
any appeal to rational expectations models 
that are the normal staple of much of moder 
macroeconomics. Krugman (1998) criticized 
the IMF for playing the role of armchair mar- 
ket psychologists, a role for which they were 
eminently unqualified, with a commensu- 
rately weak track record. Stiglitz (1999) pro- 
vided a more detailed critique of the underly- 
ing theories. 
8. For an econometric analysis for the 
United States, see Furman and Stiglitz 
(1998b). 
9. In the jargon of standard economics, 
low-income individuals have a high level of 
risk aversion and have little access to mecha- 
nisms with which to divest themselves of the 
risks they face. This can be viewed as an im- 
portant instance of market failure. 
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10. That is, taking into account the imper- 
fections of information and the costs of trans- 
actions, for example, associated with creating 
markets. See, for example, Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (1986). 
11. But even this needs to be qualified. 
Newbery and Stiglitz showed that when risk 
markets are imperfect-which they always 
are in practice-free trade may actually make 
everyone worse off. See Newbery and Stiglitz 
(1984). 
12. In particular, Murdock and Stiglitz 
(1993) and Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz 
(1996, 2000) showed that restrictions on finan- 
cial markets may be welfare enhancing. 
13. This is the essential point of the large 
literature on "local public goods." See Tiebout 
(1956) and Stiglitz (1983a, 1983b). 
14. For an analysis of the Latin American 
case, refer to Galvin and Hausman (1996). 
15. See, for example, Weitzman (1974) or a 
standard public sector textbook, such as 
Stiglitz (2000b). 
16. See Kaplan and Rodrik (2001). To be 
sure, its downturn was somewhat longer than 
it might otherwise have been because Finance 
Minister Anwar at first tried the standard 
IMF recipes (in what was called an IMF pro- 
gram without the IMF), raising interest rates 
and cutting back on public expenditures. 
Recovery only began when these policies were 
reversed. 
17. There remains some controversy over 
whether in 2000 Thailand was more successful 
in attracting foreign investment than Malay- 
sia, with disputes both about data and their in- 
terpretation. What matters for growth, of 
course, are greenfield investments, not simply 
foreigners buying already existing assets, un- 
less the funds they provide to the country in 
doing so are themselves turned into invest- 
ments. Large fire sales in Thailand might tem- 
porarily succeed in diverting funds from Ma- 
laysia but are hardly indicative of a better 
"strategy." 
18. There are certain practical problems in 
the implementation of such provisions, which 
can easily be overcome. Because firms will be 
tempted to use derivatives to subvert the in- 
tent of these tax provisions, there will have to 
be netting provisions, with full disclosure of 
derivative positions (enforced, e.g., by laws 
that limit the enforceability of derivative posi- 
tions that are not disclosed, or giving them ju- 
nior positions in the event of bankruptcy). 
Similarly, debt covenants making debt imme- 
diately callable in the event of certain circum- 
stances (such as those associated with a crisis) 
should either be made not enforceable or 
bonds with those provisions not be given favor- 
able tax treatment. 
19. A situation analogous to that encoun- 
tered in the United States in the savings and 
loan debacle. 
20. Proponents of capital market liberal- 
ization (including those in the IMF) underesti- 
mated these distortions, simply because they 
did not understand the functioning of capital 
markets and the ways that such markets differ 
from ordinary markets for goods and services. 
In their simplistic models, capital in a well- 
functioning economy (which most developing 
countries are not) is allocated (as if) by an auc- 
tion process to the borrower offering the high- 
est interest rate, just like any other good is al- 
located to the buyer offering the highest price. 
Thus, the fact that real estate was offering the 
best interest rates meant that that had to be 
the highest return activity. And it was simply 
assumed that if there were mistakes in judg- 
ment, only the lender would bear the cost of 
such mistakes. In fact, capital is not allocated 
by an auction process (see Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981; Greenwald and Stiglitz forthcoming) but 
by a screening process, and for an obvious rea- 
son: those offering the highest interest rates 
may not be those most likely to repay. More- 
over, we have seen that when large numbers of 
debtors cannot repay the loans, there are 
macro-economic consequences, with others be- 
sides those who have borrowed and lent hav- 
ing to bear the costs. 
21. Although not necessarily: the availabil- 
ity of new sources of credit can increase the de- 
mand for imports, even if relative prices re- 
main relatively unchanged. This seems to 
have been the case recently in Iceland. See 
Stiglitz (2001a). 
22. Many advocates of capital market liber- 
alization, especially those that appeal to the 
analogy of the benefits of free markets for 
goods, fail to appreciate these market failures 
and their consequences. 
23. Themselves explicable in terms of im- 
perfect information. See Stiglitz (2000b). 
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24. That is, if the initial exchange rate is 
140 to the dollar, the true equilibrium is 190 to 
the dollar; in the initial adjustment, the ex- 
change rate may overshoot to 210 to the dollar. 
25. Moreover, while the IMF tried to char- 
acterize there being a trade-off, as we saw ear- 
lier there was none: the high interest rates in- 
tended to prevent a devaluation simply 
pushed the economy deeper into recession, 
weakening confidence in the country and its 
currency. 
26. For instance, Korea, at the time that the 
crisis struck, did not have a balance of trade 
deficit. In the old world, before capital market 
liberalization, the link between trade deficits 
and crises was closer. 
27. Highlighted by the fact that in the typi- 
cal macro-models employed by the IMF, bank- 
ruptcy and default were not modeled, although 
bankruptcy and default were at the center of 
the global financial crisis. 
28. For a more extensive discussion of these 
points, see Stiglitz (forthcoming). 
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